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The Evaluation of EU Aid to ACP countries is part of a general evaluation of EU aid requested by the 
Development  Council  in  June  1995.  The  second  phase  of  the  study  focuses  on:  (i) policy 
formulation;  (ii) policy  dialogue  between  the  EC  and  the  individual  ACP  states~  and  (iii) aid 
implementation and management. 
The  field  stage  looks  at  policy  dialogue  and  aid  implementation  in  six  countries  and  one  region 
concentrating  on  three  sectors  of EC  assistance  in  each  country/region.  The  present  report  is 
concerned with the programme in Jamaica.  The other six reports cover Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Liberia and the East Caribbean. 
The field study of the Jamaica programme is based on the findings from a short visit to Jamaica that 
was undertaken between February 27 and March 13  1998.  The in-country field work was organised 
around: 
•  the review of project files; 
•  interviews with staff in the EC Delegation; 
•  interviews with representations of the EU Member States in Jamaica; 
•  interviews with government officials; and 
•  interviews with programme and project staff. 
The draft report was presented in  May  1998 to the Working Group of Heads of Evaluation Services 
(Development) of the European Union and the Commission. 
The evaluation team is  grateful for the support of the EC Delegation, and for  the collaboration of 
Government officials and the representatives of other donors (particularly Member States). 
C. Montes 
ACP Evaluation Field Phase Coordinator 
Those wishing to obtain copies of the synthesis report or the other case studies should contact the 
Head of  the Evaluation Unit,  Common Service Relex of  the European Commission. Executive Summary 
EXECUTIVES~RY 
Country Context 
Jamaica,  with  a  population  of 2.5  million  is 
ranked  among  the  middle-income  countries 
and  in  1996  had  a  per  capita  income  of 
US$ 2,340.  The  lack of a  diversified  export 
sector and  the  high  dependence  on  imported 
energy  make  the  Jamaican  economy 
vulnerable to international prices and demand 
changes. 
Jamaica has been undergoing economic reform 
since  1978  with  and  increased  emphasis  on 
market  reforms  in  recent  years.  Despite 
initially  positive  results  in  trade  reform  and 
macroeconomic  adjustment,  the  economic 
situation has  deteriorated since  1995.  A key 
factor in the past has been the inability of the 
Bank  of  Jamaica  (BOJ)  to  control  money 
supply.  The  severe  crisis  in  the  banking 
sector  has  had  a  severe  fiscal  impact.  The 
budget  deficit  increased  to  14%  of  GDP 
during the first  nine  months of 1997.  About 
half of budgetary allocations are now required 
for debt servicing. 
Indices  of  living  standards  are  generally 
favourable with an  average life expectancy of 
70 years, and infant mortality of 24 per 1,000 
births.  However,  macroeconomic failure  has 
resulted  in  increased  unemployment  and 
deteriorating  social  services.  A  National 
Poverty  Eradication  Programme  has  been 
launched. 
Current levels of aid to Jamaica are equivalent 
to around 4% of GDP.  The EC is  the largest 
donor providing over 50% of all grants.  Other 
EU  Member  States  also  have  active  aid 
programme.  More  than  60%  of the  external 
financing  is  received  by  the  Government  as 
loans  with  the  Inter-American  Development 
Bank  the  major  source  of  such  fmancing. 
There  are  a  number  of mechanisms  through 
which  donors  coordinate  their  assistance 
programmes  and  in  which  the  EC  plays  an 
active role. 
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EC Aid to Jamaica 
EC  financial  assistance  to  Jamaica  includes: 
(i) project  aid  from  the  National  Indicative 
Programme  (NIP);  (ii) programme  aid  from 
the  structural  adjustment  and  SYSMIN 
facilities; and (iii) risk capital and interest rate 
subsidies  managed  by  the  European 
Investment  Bank  (Eill).  Grant  allocations 
under  EDF 7  had  reached  140  Mecu  by  the 
end of 1997  with  an  additional  110  Mecu of 
lending from the Em.  NIP allocations totalled 
50 Mecu, of which  30%  had  been  disbursed. 
Project aid has concentrated on  the  water and 
sanitation  and  roads  sectors.  Jamaica  also 
benefits  from  a  number  of EC  budget  lines. 
Assistance under the EC'  s Caribbean Regional 
Indicative  Programme  is  also  significant  and 
the 'Delegation  in  Jamaica  is  responsible  for 
four  regional  programmes  with  assistance 
focused on higher education and tourism. 
The  Minister  of  Finance  is  the  National 
Authorising  Officer  (NAO)  for  the  EC 
assistance to  Jamaica.  The NAO's secretariat 
functions  are  executed  by  the  Planning 
Institute  of  Jamaica  (PI  OJ),  which  is  a 
department within the Ministry of Finance. A 
good working relationship exists  between the 
PIOJ and the Delegation and involves regular 
meetings to discuss aid programme issues. 
The Delegation in  Jamaica is  responsible  for 
EC  relations  with  Jamaica,  Belize  and  the 
Bahamas.  It  is  staffed  by  the  Head  of 
Delegation, an Economic Advisor, a Technical 
Advisor  and  an  Administrative  Officer.  In 
addition  to  these  permanent  posts,  there  are 
Technical  Assistants  covering  the  water 
sector, rural development, and training.  There 
are  regular  monthly  coordination  meetings 
with the representations of the Member States 
which focus  primarily on the political aspects 
of cooperation.  For the EDF 8 programming 
exercise  the  Delegation  undertook  extensive 
consultation with the Member States. Policy Dialogue 
The EC has sought to conduct an increasingly 
active  policy dialogue  with  the  Government. 
This has mainly been concerned with ensuring 
consistency between the EC'  s aid programme 
and the Government's policy objectives, with 
a more limited involvement in  fiscal  issues in 
the  context  of  the  structural  adjustment 
support programme. 
The  indicative  programming  exercise  for 
EDF 8 was spread over a two year period and 
involved  a  lengthy  consultation  process  with 
the  Member States  in  the  preparation  of the 
Strategy  Paper  and  the  Government  in  the 
development  of  the  NIP.  The  PIOJ  was 
positive  about  the  exercise  and  felt  that  the 
resulting  programme  reflected  well  the 
priorities of the Government.  Member States 
considered  that  they  had  been  kept  will 
informed, but some concerns were noted about 
the  programming process  and  the  realism  of 
some implementation assumptions. 
The  EC  has  supported  the  economic 
stabilisation  package  negotiated  between  the 
BWI and the Government.  Its involvement in 
the policy dialogue has  mainly in the "second 
tier" of structural adjustment reforms where its 
particular  concern  h'lS  been  to  address  the 
social  consequences  of structural  adjustment 
and  the  "protection"  of  key  social 
expenditures.  Much  of this  discussion  has 
focused on the use of counterpart funds rather 
than  social  sector  refonns  or  budgetary 
management improvement. 
At  the  sector  level,  the  EC  has  contributed 
effectively  to  the  development  of policy  in 
water  supply,  small-scale  agriculture  and 
bananas.  In  water,  key  policy  and  strategy 
issues  relating  to  access,  fmancing  and 
management  have  only  recently  begun  to  be 
addressed  following  the  publication  of  the 
Government paper on  Social  Water in  1994. 
The Delegation has coordinated a donor group 
on  water  which  has  had  some  influence  in 
assisting  the  Government  to  better define  its 
policy  stance.  However,  EC  support  in 
strengthening the National Water Commission 
(NWC)  has  faced  considerable  difficulties. 
Policy  dialogue  on  bananas  h?s  been 
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supported  by  an  EC  budget  line.  This 
programme has achieved considerable success 
in  the  areas  of  disease  control  and  credit 
provision.  In the  key  policy areas  relating to 
the  negotiations  with  the  WTO  and  the 
transitional  problems  faced  by  the  sector, 
successful  policy  dialogue  appears  to  have 
been more difficult. 
Aid Implementation and Management 
A  strength  of the  institutional  arrangements 
for  the  management of EC  aid  in  Jamaica is 
that  the  NAO' s office is  fully  integrated into 
the  PIOJ.  However,  some  concern  was 
expressed that the  system was too centralised 
and that this had reduced the level and quality 
of  contact  between  Iruntstries  and  the 
Delegation,  particularly  on  policy  and 
technical issues. 
The  identification  of project and  programme 
proposals  is  primarily  undertaken  by  line 
ministries and parastatal agencies and in some 
cases has been too influenced by the history of 
previous  EC  aid  interventions.  Also,  in  the 
past  there  was  insufficient  discussion  with 
private  sector and  civil  society  organisations 
in  the  programming  of EC  assistance.  The 
heavy  reliance  on  consultants  and  limited 
resources  with  the  Government  and 
Delegation for reviewing project proposals has 
led to some problems with project design. 
Decision  making  procedures  within 
Government  on  issues  relating  to  the 
management  and  implementation  of EC  aid 
are often complex involving several different 
levels.  Tendering  proc\!d::res  tend  to  be 
protracted and results  in  significant delays in 
securing  both  government  and  EC  approval. 
The  heavy  administrative  burden  on  the 
Delegation significantly reduces  its  ability  to 
deploy its professional skills effectively. Chapter I  Country Context 
CHAPTER I.  COUNTRY CONTEXT 
A.  The Economy 
Jamaica, with a total area of approximately 11,000 km
2
,  is located 145 km south of Cuba and 160 km 
west of Haiti. It has a population of about 2.5  million, of whom about 55% live in urban areas.  Per 
capita GDP was  US$  2,340 in  1996,  ranking Jamaica among middle  income countries.  However, 
wealth  and  income  distribution  are  heavily  skewed.  The  main  economic  activities  are  tourism, 
manufacturing, bauxite/alumina mining,  and  in  employment terms,  agriculture.  The country  is  the 
third  largest  producer of bauxite  in  the  world  and  has  a  strong  natural  resource  base.  In  1996 
alumina/bauxite exports represented more than 50% of exports. 
Merchandise  imports  were  equivalent  to  about  57%  of GDP  in  1996  while  exports  and  tourism 
receipts amounted to about 51% of GDP (Table 1). The high degree of market concentration in  the 
country's merchandise exports, the dependence on imported oil for commercial energy consumption 
and the relative importance of tourism, make the economy highly sensitive to international price and 
demand  changes.  Furthermore,  because  the  island  is  small,  severe  weather  can  have  a 
disproportionate impact on the economy. 
Table 1: Key Economic Indicators 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Real GOP growth rates 
GOP(%)  1.5  1.3  1.0  0.0  -1.4 
GDP per capita (%}  0.5  0.4  -0.1  -1.2  -2.4 
Origin of GOP (in % of GOP at current prices 
Agriculture  7.9  8.2  9.2  9.3  8.3 
Mining  9.4  6.5  7.3  7.1  5.9 
Manufacturing  19.4  18.5  18.8  17.5  16.8 
Construction  12.8  12.6  12.0  12.8  11.7 
Government services  6.6  10.2  8.3  9.2  11.4 
Other services  46.2  46.1  46.3  46.1  47.7 
Net Exports (in % of GDP)  -1.0  -9.6  -7.2  -12.7  -11.9 
Exports of goods and non-factor services  65.7  55.0  60.0  56.1  50.9 
Imports of goods and non-factor services  -66.7  -64.6  -67.2  -68.8  -62.8 
Inflation (average CPI) {%)  77.3  22.1  35.1  19.9  26.4 
Current account (in % of GOP) (1)  -0.1  -1.4  0.3  -5.0  -3.8 
Sourt:e: IMF, 1997 
For fiscal year starting April 1 
IDC - August 1998  3 Chapter I  Country Context 
B.  Economic Adjustment 
Jamaica's history of economic  reforms  dates  back to  1978,  following  the  second oil shock
1
•  The 
latest  extended  arrangement  of the  Th1F  was  completed  in  March  1996.  In  the  1990s,  and  in 
particular since  1995, the Government accelerated the implementation of market reforms.  This led 
initially to an  improvement in Jamaica's external position, reflected in higher international reserves, 
elimination of external arrears, and a decline in  the ratio of external public debt to GDP.  However, 
inflation during  1992-96  remained  high,  averaging 24%  annually.  Between  1994  and  1997,  per 
capita income declined and practically all economic indicators show a deteriorating trend. The public 
sector remains large, and labour relations difficult. 
Despite  earlier  positive  results  in  trade  reform  and  macroeconomic  adjustment,  the  country's 
situation has worsened since early  1995. Growth in domestic credit, and inflows of private transfers 
and foreign capital, contributed to faster growth in  money supply.  Liquidity support from the Bank 
of Jamaica (BOJ) to cushion banking institutions in crisis contributed to excessive monetary growth 
which was fuelled by demand pressures arising from real wage increases in the public sector2 and the 
private sector.  By  late  1995,  the  merchandise trade  account was  in deficit  by  US$  1 billion.  This 
contributed to  the deterioration of the current account with a reversal of the US$  18  million surplus 
attained in  1994 to  a deficit of US$ 255  million in  1995. Additionally, depreciation of the currency 
induced  by  strong  import demand  and  growing  speculative pressures,  following  instability  in  the 
fmancial sector, triggered an acceleration of inflation. 
Monetary Performance 
The  inability  of the  BOJ  to  control  money  supply  has  been  a  key  factor  in  the  continuing 
macroeconomic  crisis  in  Jamaica.  Despite  recent  steps  to  reform  the  institutional  structure  and 
autonomy, the BOJ has remained under strong political pressure to finance fiscal deficits.
3 
From mid 1995, the Government embarked on a policy of maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate 
in  order to  reduce inflationary pressures. The rationale was that given the import dependence of the 
country, depreciation of the currency would directly lead to domestic price appreciation. This implied 
maintaining  relatively  high  interest  rates,  increasing  the  reserve  requirement  of banks  to  reduce 
lending,  and  taking  an  active  position  in  central  bank  open  market  operations.  Lending  rates 
fluctuated  from  a  low  of 15%  to  a  high of over 70%,  reflecting Government efforts  to  curb  the 
inflationary spiral and the depreciation in the exchange rate. 
With the  implementation from  1996/97  of a tighter macroeconomic  policy,  interest rates  initially 
declined although remaining high in  real terms.  This induced a surge in capital inflows which led 
initially to a large appreciation of the Jamaican dollar in real terms by May 19S, I compared with the 
average for  1993-95.  This  resulted in  a sharp deterioration of the  terms of trade affecting export 
earnings from agricultural products, garments and tourism. 
The situation in the fmancial and foreign exchange market changed perceptibly in the early months of 
1997. The growth of base money accelerated to almost twice the targeted inflation rate, and interest 
rates on six month T-Bills declined from 26% to  16% between December 1996 and March 1997.  In 
Since 1978 there have been  12 IMF programmes. 5 World Bank Structural Adjustment Operations. and 3 World 
Bank Sector Adjustment Operations linked to loans totalling more than US$ 1 billion. 
Following payment of salary increases backdated by 24 months. 
Report of  the Committee Appointed by the Government of  Jamaica to Examine the Role of  the Bank of  Jamaica. 
January  1994.  See especially the  dissenting annex  by  Gladstone Bannick.  By  law  the BOJ can be  required  to 
increase money supply by up to about 20% of GDP through 'temporary advances' to government of up to  30% of 
estimated revenues (which are rarely repaid on time and are therefore a straight addition to high powered money). 
and through issuing securities to finance up to 40% of fiscal year estimated expenditures. 
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the following  six  months,  the current account deficit  substantially  worsened.  Despite  attempts  to 
restrain  money  growth,  the  money  supply  increased  at  rates  above  programmed  levels,  adding to 
inflation.  More recent attempts to restrain money growth have resulted in a sharp rise in interest rates 
(with six-month T-bills reaching 30% in February 1998), which has contributed to a fall in inflation.
4 
Financial Crisis 
Since liberalisation of the foreign exchange market in  1991, Jamaica has experienced an accelerated 
inflow of foreign capital, as high real interest rates have ensured a large inflow of speculative capital. 
Investment  in  brokerage  houses,  commercial  banks,  insurance  companies  and  building  societies 
soared, and financial services grew from less than 6% of GDP to about 15% of GDP. The regulatory 
authorities  could  not  keep  up  with  capital  inflow.  There  were  difficulties  in  supervision  and 
enforcement as well as moral hazard problems of banks owning insurance houses. When the currency 
stabilised in 1995, interest rates fell and many investors cashed in their holdings.  The resulting fall in 
property values led to a crisis in the insurance and banking sector and at the end of 1995, commercial 
banks  were  burdened  with  J$  6.8  billion  in  non-performing  loans,  representing  14%  of  their 
combined portfolio. During 1996, a number of banks collapsed or closed down. 
This forced the Government to present a supplementary budget in January 1997 allocating about 5% 
of GDP to support the restructuring of problem institutions. It  also established the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company (FINSAC), to  administer the funds drawn from the  budget to coordinate and 
manage  the  restructuring  of the  sector.  During  1997,  FINSAC  took  major  stakes  in  all  but  one 
domestic bank. In  addition, the BOJ provided liquidity to  banks equivalent to about 5% of GDP in 
face of deposit withdrawals from two fmancial institutions.  By early 1998 the BOJ reported that an 
estimated  20%  of  bank  loans  were  non-performing  and  all  except  two  domestically  owned 
commercial banks had faced either massive government intervention or major public recapitalisation. 
The costs of bailing out the insurance and banking system to date have been estimated as equivalent 
to 13-14% of GDP.
5  The recent increase in interest rates is having a large impact on the performance 
of loans, and is raising the cost of FINSAC' s activities significant!  y. 
Fiscal Policy 
The problems in the monetary sector have had a severe affect on fiscal management. After two years 
of surplus, the overall public sector recorded a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in FY 1996/97.  For the first 
nine months of 1997, the deficit jumped to J$ 31.2 billion, including amortisation, or 14% of GDP. 
Tax revenues on the other hand continue to perfonn poorly reflecting the general downturn of the 
economy.  Recurrent expenditures stood at 59.2% of budgetary expenditure during FY 1995/96 and 
increased to 61.1% during FY 1996-97.  The wage bill, which accounts for over 70% of non-interest 
eJCpenditures, is a major strain on budgetary expenditure. 
At the end of 1996, US$ 5.45 billion, approximately 46% of the total budgetary allocation, was being 
used for debt-service payments. This reduced the amounts available for discretionary expenditure.
6 
4  Data available subsequent to  the  Mission show that inflation in the fiscal  year  1997/98 was  less  than 9%,  the 
lowest level in 10 years. 
FIN  SAC's financing  is  provided  through  the  issuance of debt guaranteed by the  Government.  If FIN  SAC is 
unable to service this debt, the consequences for future budgets could be severe. 
Oat~ available  subsequent to  the Mission show that  the situation further deteriorated at  the  end of fiscal  year 
1997/98. 
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C.  Social Indicators 
Jamaica's living standard indices are favourable compared to other middle-income countries in  the 
region.  Life  expectancy  is  over  70  years,  infant  mortality  is  24  per  1,000  live  births,  severe 
malnutrition is  rare and child immunisation almost universal.  However, macroeconomic failure has 
contributed to acute social distress in Jamaica, with reductions in employment, and failing services. 




The educational sector is  reported to be suffering deteriorating quality and inequity in the provision 
of resources  and education opportunities.  Schools are  under-resourced,  educational materials  are 
severely  limited  and  reduced  levels  of  maintenance  expenditures  have  affected  the  physical 
environments  of many  schools.  Furthermore,  available  resources  are  not  distributed  equitably. 
Schools  serving students  from  low-income  families  areas  are  relatively  poorly equipped,  in  poor 
physical condition, and suffer from overcrowding.  Of the 15-19 age group, 13.5% are reported to be 
illiterate, rising to 17.3% for the 20-24 age group. 
Health 
The  disease  profile  in  Jamaica  is  increasingly  life  style  related,  resembling  that  of developed 
countries. Death is due less frequently due to infectious and vector borne disease than to chronic and 
degenerative diseases which are inherently more expensive to treat. Concern remains, however, about 
high and preventable peri-natal mortality rates.  Injuries including homicides are the second leading 
cause of morbidity and rank as the main cause of death among males aged 15-44. The high level of 
crime, predominant in poor urban neighbourhoods illustrates this development. 
Prolonged insufficient public funding for health care has caused a serious deterioration in the quality 
of care  in  public health  facilities.  One  result  has  been  a  significant shift  to  private providers  for 
outpatient care, even among poorer groups. Compared to private facilities, public facilities are in  a 
poor state of repair and lack equipment and basic supplies. 
Water and Sanitation 
According to  the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions (1995),  about 42% of the  rural dwellings 
obtain drinking water from rain tanks, rivers, and lakes. By contrast, in the Kingston Metropolitan 
Area 97% of the dwellings have indoor tap or private tap/pipe outside.  Most people have access to 
sanitation facilities. In  rural areas schools, health centres and other public facilities are three times 
more likely to lack adequate sanitation, thereby increasing overall health risks. 
Social Expenditures 
Benefit incidence tables derived from the living standards surveys show a broadly progressive public 
expenditure  profile  for  health  and education,  perhaps  reflecting the  use  made  by  higher income 
groups  of private  services.  The  poorer  quintiles  benefit  more  than  proportionately  from  basic 
education and health expenditures, although post basic service benefits are more skewed towards the 
higher quintiles. Access to sewerage and indoor water is however still very much biased to higher 
income groups. 
See World Bank, Caribbean Countries Poverty Reduction and Human Resource Development in tt.: Caribbean, 
1996, Table 3, p 165. 
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Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Poverty is  a  significant issue  in  both  rural  and urban  areas,  and a  serious  threat  to  the  fabric  of 
Jamaican  society.  A  National  Poverty  Eradication  Progr~ run  from  the  Office  of the  Prime 
Minister,  has  been launched  which  seeks  to  mobilise all  available resources  in  a  streamlined and 
coordinated manner.  It does not, however, add new national resources. It has few own resources and 
staff,  and  is  essentially  an  attempt  at  programming  sectoral  expenditures  which  are  intended  to 
address critical poverty issues. One component of the programme is  the Jamaica Social Investment 
Fund, to which the EC has contributed. 
D.  The Management of International Aid 
Current levels of aid and lending to Jamaica are equivalent to around 4% of GOP.  Table 2 shows the 
composition of aid.  The EC is  the biggest donor and provides more than 50% of all grants.  Of the 
EU Member States,  the  Netherlands,  Germany  and  the  UK  provide  aid  to  Jamaica.  The  French 
support Jamaica through  small  loans  channelled  through  its  Caisse Franc;aise  de  Developpement. 
Other EU Member States with a presence in  the country are Italy and Spain. Non-European donors 
with a significant aid programme are the USA and Canada, who contributed 19% and 11% of all aid 
between  1993  and  1997.  Lenders active  in  the country are  the  Inter-American  Development Bank 
(IADB) and World Bank. More than 60% of the external funds received by Jamaica are loans. 
Table 2:  Composition of Aid Disbursements 
Avge Annual Dis- Share of TotaVGrant 
bursement 93-97  aid/Loans 
(US$ mill)  (%) 
Grant aid  91  38 
UN System  9  10 
EC  48  53 
United States  17  19 
Canada  10  11 
The Nether1ands  3  3 
Gennany  2  2 
UK  0.7  0.8 
Others  0.5  0.6 
Loans  148  62 
lA  DB  106  72 
IBRD  32  22 
COB  9  6 
Others  0.2  0.1 
Total  238  100 
Source:  UNDP. 
Note:  The data are not entirely reliable, and should be regarded only as a 
broad indicator of aid flows. 
Coordination 
UNDP organises annual retreats with all donors and lenders present in Jamaica. In addition, donors 
come together several times a year to discuss issues relevant to a particular sector. The EC Delegation 
is active in several such donor coordination groups. It leads the donor group on infrastructure, water 
and sewage, which corresponds to the priority activities within the EC aid programme. The meetings 
are used to discuss donor/lender support programmes and to review government performance in these 
sectors. The EC also participates in a coordination initiative on the environment. 
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CHAPTER II.  EC AID TO JAMAICA 
A.  Size and Composition of EC Aid 
EC financial assistance provided to  Jamaica from the European Development Fund (ED  F) covers a 
wide  range  of  instruments:  (i) project  aid  from  the  National  Indicative  Programme  (NIP); 
(ii) programme aid from the Structural Adjustment and SYSMIN facilities; and (iii) risk capital and 
interest  rates  subsidies  managed  by  the  EIB.  In  addition  the  EIB  provides  loans  from  its  own 
resources and additional grant funds are provided from the EC Budget. Jamaica also benefits from the 
regionally funded programmes. The instruments of EC financial assistance provided to Jamaica over 
time showed a clear trend towards  less  grant aid  and  more  loans.  From 6.5%  under EDF 5,  loans 
accounted for 45% of financial assistance to Jamaica under EDF 6 and 44% under EDF 7 or 61% if 
SYSMIN which  is  a non-programmable allocation,  is  excluded.  However, under EDF 8 no  loans 
have been programmed.  Table 3 shows the breakdown. 
,, 
Table 3:  EC Aid to Jamaica (Mecu)(1> 
Lome II- Lome 11/- Lome Ill/- Lome IV/-
EDF4<•>  EDF5<•>  EDF6  EDF7 
National Indicative Programme (NIP)  20.0  26.4  40.2  49.7 
Sysmin  0.0  25.0  0.0  70.0 
Structural Adjustment Support (
2
)  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5 
EC Budget Unes (outside EDF)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (13.3) 
Risk Capital  0.07  5.0  2.3  5.0 
Interest Rate ,subsidies  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0 
Total Grants (JJ  20.1  57.1  42.5  140.5 
Loans From EIB Own Resources  4.0  34.3  105.0 
All EC Financial Assistance  20.1  61.1  76.8  245.5 
Source: Co-operation between the EU and Jamaica, Annual report 1995 and 1997 
Notes: 
(1) Regional cooperation excluded. 
(2)  Additional to this amount, under EDF 6 General and Sector Import Programmes (14.9 Mecu) were financed 
from the NIP. 4.6 Mecu from NIP EDF 7 were allocated to structural adjustment support under a General Import 
Programme. 
(3) grants include heavily subsidised loans (long-term 0-2%) that are originating from EDF resources. 
(4)  Balances to EDF 4 and 5 were transferred to EDF 6 and 7 respectively at the end of 1990 and 1993, but are 
not included here in EDF 6 and 7. 
Project Aid 
The  NIP,  agreed  upon  by  the  Government  and  the  EC,  identifies  the  focal  sectors  for  project 
assistance for each EDF (Table 4).  At the end of 1997, 99.5% of all funds provided from EDF 7 were 
committed,  while  disbursements  were  more  than  30%  of the  commitments.  Commitments  under 
EDF 8 await the ratification of the Convention by mid 1998.
8 
A financing decision for an amount of 10 Mecu with a suspensive clause was already taken in November 1997. 
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Project aid has been concentrated on  water and sanitation, and roads. Water and sanitation projects 
accounted  for  29%  of all  grant  aid  committed  from  EDF 7  (including  balances  from  EDF 5  and 
SYSMIN) and roads for 56%. The General Import Programme (GIP) accounted for 10% of the initial 
NIP allocation under EDF 7. 
Table 4:  Initial NIP Allocations Under EDF 7 and EDF 8 
NIP EDF7  NIP EDF 8 
Sectors Prioritised  Mecu  %of NIP  Mecu  %of NIP 
1.  Rural and Agricultural Development 
12.0  26%  38.0  63%  (FP1 );  Poverty Alleviation (FP2) 
water and sanitation,  water and sanitation, 
Sub-Sectors  agriculture.  agriculture, micro-projects, 
Social Investment Fund, 
SME credit. 
2.  Infrastructure  22.0  I 
48%  15.0  I 
25% 
Sub-Sectors  road infrastructure.  road infrastructure 
3.  Action Outside Focal Objectives  7.4  I 
16%  7.0  I  12.0%. 
human resource develop- trade development, other 
Sub-Sectors  ment, T  A and studies,  areas (environment, good 
cultural cooperation.  governance, drugs), TA for 
NAO and studies 
4.  Structural adjustment, import 
4.6  10%  0.0  0%  programme. 
Total  46.0(1)  100.0%  60.0  100.0% 
Source:  National Indicative Programme for Jamaica, Fourth  Lam~  Convention, First and Second Financial 
Protocol. 
Notes: 
(1)  In 1995 an additional contribution of 3.7 Mecu was allocated to Jamaica to complement the funds 
allocated for the NIP under EDF 7. These were not foreseen when the NIP was programmed. 
(2)  These funds are additional to the structural adjustment facility, which awarded Jamaica 2.5 Mecu from 
its EDF 7 funds, and to the EDF 6 allocation. 
Structural Adjustment Support 
Under EDF 7,  Jamaica received 2.5  Mecu  from  the Structural Adjustment Facility,  to  which  was 
added 1.3 Mecu transferred from EDF 4.  A further 4.6 Mecu was allocated from the NIP for EDF 7, 
bringing the total under the General Import Programme (GIP) to 8.4 Mecu.  The EDF 6 Sector Import 
Programme, totalling 13.6 Mecu, was fmanced from the NIP. The counterpart funds created by the 
import programmes were 'targeted' to social expenditures. 
SYSMIN 
The SYSMIN facility allows for compensation for losses in export earnings in the mining sector. As 
an  important  producer  and  exporter  of bauxite  and  aluminium  Jamaica  has  benefited  on  two 
occasions in  recent years from this facility.  The compensation received was allocated to  economic 
diversification in both cases.  Under EDF 5 a SYSMIN facility of 25 Mecu was awarded and invested 
in  the  construction  of  sewerage  systems  in  Ocho  Rios  and  Negril  which  are  still  under 
implementation.  In  1997  the  EC agreed  to  provide  80 Mecu for  the  construction of the Northern 
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Coastal  Highway,  of which  70 Mecu  was  provided  from  the  SYSMIN  facility  for  export  losses 
incurred in  1993. 
EC Budget Line Aid 
Besides  the  assistance  financed  from  the  EDF,  Jamaica benefits  from  certain  budget  lines.  Aid 
fmanced directly from the EC budget is related to the following areas: 
•  Special system of assistance to traditional banana suppliers, technical assistance (T  A) and 
income  support (commitments:  2.0 Mecu  in  1995,  3.0 Mecu  in  1996  and  5.7  Mecu in 
1997). 
•  Food aid (commitment: 0.8 Mecu in  1995) 
•  Democracy and human rights (commitment: 0.2 Mecu) 
•  Ecology in developing countries (commitments: 0.6 Mecu in  1995) 
•  Tropical forestry (commitment: 0.4 Mecu in  1997) 
•  NGO co-financing (commitment: 0.8 Mecu in 1996 and 1997) 
EIB assistance 
The EDF has  fmanced risk capital (interest rate 0-2%) and interest rate subsidies managed by the 
Em.  In addition the Em has provided loans from its own resources at rates of between 4% and 6.5%. 
The  assistance  targets  the  industrial  sector  through  credit  programmes,  infrastructure, 
telecommunications and tourism: 


















JBM alumina (loan: 4 Mecu). 
National Development Bank (risk capital: 5 Mecu). 
Kingston Container Terminal (loan: 16 Mecu). 
National Development Bank (2loans: 13 Mecu, risk capital 1 Mecu). 
Port of Monte  go Bay (loan: 5.25 Mecu). 
Trafalgar Development Bank (risk capital: 1 Mecu). 
Jamaica caustic soda plant (risk capital: 0.3 Mecu). 
National Development Bank (2loans: 24 Mecu). 
Trafalgar Development Bank (loan: 5 Mecu, risk capital 3 Mecu). 
Jamaica Public Service Power (loan: 9 Mecu). 
Montego Bay free Zone extension (loan 7 Mecu). 
Jamaica Venture Fund (risk capital: 2 Mecu). 
Telecommunications of Jamaica (loan: 40 Mecu). 
King Container Terminal II (loan: 20 Mecu). 
Aid and Trade 
Although the EC's relations with Jamaica may be focused on  the aid  programme, the Lome trade 
protocols  and  other  preferences  have  also  benefited  the  country  considerably.  Jamaica enjoys  a 
privileged position as a traditional banana supplier to the EU and is one of the few ACP countries that 
has a guaranteed market for its sugar exports to Europe
9
•  The guaranteed sugar price in the European 
market is almost double the world market price.  For 1994 the resulting annual 'gain' was calculated 
9  The sugar quota under Lome is currently 129,017  tonnes duty free and an additional 24,000 with a limited duty of 
81  ECU per tonne.  The banana quota under Lome IV is currently 105,000 tonnes duty free. 
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to be  around 42 Mecu.  Although  a  pJ.rt  of this  is  lost  in  the  distribution chain in  the EU,  there 
remains a substantial benefit for Jamaica. The 'gain' from the banana protocol in 1994 was calculated 
to be around 12 Mecu. 
EC Assistance to Jamaica From the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme 
Jamaica benefits from EC support channelled through the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme 
(CRlP). The Delegation is  responsible for  four regional aid programmes managed in  part or fully 
from Jamaica.  Among  these  is  assistance  to  the  University  of the  West  Indies  (6.2 Mecu  under 
EDF 6),  a  Caribbean  University  Level  Programme  (21  Mecu  from  EDF 7  for  the  whole  region), 
CARIFORUM: Cultural Centres, one of which will be in Jamaica (0.5 Mecu), and a Caribbean Hotel 
Training Programme, which was financed from EDF 6.  Jamaica also benefits from the region-wide 
programmes managed from other Delegations or from the ACP Secretariat in trade, agriculture, drugs 
control,  decentralised  cooperation,  and  the  tourism  sector,  and  is  involved  in  the  Caribbean 
Examinations Council Programme. 
B.  Institutional Arrangements for EC Aid 
National Authorising Office: the Planning Institute of  Jamaica 
The  Government  has  appointed  the  Planning  Institute  of Jamaica  (PIOJ)  to  represent  1t  m  all 
operations financed from the resources of the EDF and the Em.  The PIOJ is  a department of .the 
Ministry  of Finance  (MOF)  and  the  Government  department  responsible  for  public  investment 
financed from both domestic funds and external assistance. The Minister of Finance is the National 
Authorising  Officer  (NAO),  and  the  PIOJ  functions  as  his  technical  secretariat  performing  the 
functions  of the  'National  Authorising  Office'.  Within  the  PIOJ,  one  director  deals  with  all 
multilateral assistance, including that from the World Bank and EC.  She is supported by three staff 
who  work on EC  projects and  programmes,  two  of whom have  been  recruited recently under an 
institutional strengthening programme funded from EDF 7. All staff are Jamaican. 
In  the  programming  of the  NIP,  the  PIOJ  relies  on  (parastatal)  implementing  agencies  and  line 
ministries for the identification of projects and programmes. The PIOJ undertakes a pre-selection of 
projects before they are presented to the Committee for Public Investment Programmes,  and plays an 
important role in the appraisal and critical review of proposals made before they are submitted to the 
EC Delegation. 
The PIOJ has regular contacts with the EC Delegation and between them a good working relationship 
has been established. The EC Delegation and PIOJ hold regular meetings to which representatives 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  and MOF are occasionally invited.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs is  responsible on the Jamaican side for the trade relations with the EU and the preferential 
treatment provided by the Lome Convention. The MOF plays an important role in the management of 
the counterpart funds related to the EC import programmes (22 Mecu from EDF 6 and 7 in total). 
The EC Delegation in Jamaica 
The EC Delegation in Jamaica is responsible for EC relations with Jamaic~ Belize and the Bahamas. 
It  has  a  Head  of Delegation,  an  Economic  Adviser,  a  Technical Adviser  and an  Administrative 
Officer. The post of Economic Adviser was vacant for six months during 1997 until it was filled in 
December, while the Technical Adviser post has been vacant since January 1988 year and is expected 
to be filled in the second half of 1998. The current Head of Delegation has been in post for over four 
years and will leave by the end of 1998. In addition to the permanent Delegation posts, the Jamaican 
Delegation has had a technical assistant for its water sector operations since 1991. There is also an 
ALA  T working in the Delegation as  rural development adviser and an Expert in Training who deals 
with several regional programmes and roads (in the absence of the Technical Adviser). In addition ten 
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local staff members are appointed for secretarial and administrative support and three drivers and a 
gardener. 
Representative function of  the EC Delegation 
Increasingly  the  responsibility  of the  Delegation  is  to  represent  the  EU  in  all  spheres  of EC 
competence. Before, the Delegation dealt exclusively with co-operation issues in  the context of the 
Lome  Convention,  which,  although  it  includes  trade  issues,  was  focused  primarily  on  fmancial 
assistance.  Since  Maastricht,  the  Delegation  functions  more  like  an  embassy  with  the  Head of 
Delegation responsible to  DG I-A which manages the External Service of the EC.  This change is 
reflected in the higher profile being given to  the EC aid progranune as a foreign policy instrument. 
The Delegation has received instructions to increase visibility and Delegation staff now spend more 
time on media coverage and participation in public fora than ever before.  In  1997 the Delegate gave 
37 public addresses, about half of which were related to trade matters. 
The Delegation increasingly deals with trade as well as aid matters, due to the importance of the trade 
Protocols and preferences for Jamaica.  However, it does not currently have sufficient resources to 
deal adequately with trade matters, and wider issues of assisting the Government with its progranune 
for greater integration into the world economy and adapting to WTO rules. 
Coordination With Member States 
The EU Presidency organises monthly meetings with the Member States and the Delegation. These 
meetings deal mainly  with  the  political  aspects  of co-operation,  rather than  with  the  aid aspects. 
However, at the end of every meeting the Head of Delegation informs the Member States of progress 
made and difficulties encountered. For the  EDF 8 programming exercise, the Delegation organised 
extensive consultation with the Member States representatives. Three special meetings were held to 
discuss the draft and  revised Strategy Papers  before they  were presented to  Member States in the 
EDF Committee. Member States' representatives visited during our stay welcomed this consultation. 
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CHAPTER III.  POLICY DIALOGUE 
A.  Development and Extent of Policy Dialogue 
Policy dialogue is always difficult.  In a complex democracy such as  Jamaic~ where the Government 
retains ownership of policies, the relation between donor and government can be more complicated. 
Jamaica has a  history of popular activism  as  well as a state that has traditionally played a dominant 
role in the economy. 
The overall economic policy dialogue, led by  the BWI, has been associated with continued lack of 
sustained success in  macroeconomic policy.  The various stabilisation and adjustment programmes 
have  failed  to  set  the  economy  on  a  stable  course  (See  Chapter  IT).  The  failures  of monetary 
management and the crisis in  the banking sector in particular have placed dangerous strains on the 
Government in the form of huge contingent liabilities and non-discretionary demands on the budget. 
Given the relatively limited role of foreign aid in Jamaica the involvement of other donors in  policy 
dialogue  with  the  Government has  been  limited  in  most cases  to  issues  where  these  had  a direct 
bearing on the programmes and projects they were financing. 
Policy Dialogue Between the EC and the Government 
For the EC,  as  largest provider of grant assistance to  Jamaica
10
,  the  issue of the fungibility of aid 
financing means that broader issues of economic and sector policy are a significant concern since 
they have a major influence on the effectiveness of the aid programme.  Consequently the EC has 
sought  to  conduct  an  increasingly  active  policy  dialogue  with  the  Government.  At  the  level  of 
general economic policy, this  has  been mainly concerned with  relating the EC's aid programme to 
development  priorities,  with  a  more  limited  involvement  in  fiscal  issues  in  the  context  of the 
structural  adjustment  support  programme  (SASP).  Sectoral  dialogue  has  taken  place  in  key 
infrastructure sectors, in agriculture, and to a lesser extent in the social sectors. 
In general, the scope and quality of the dialogue has been constrained by the small size of the SASP 
and the limited staffmg of the Delegation.  Much of the dialogue focused on the technical aspects of 
aid programming and the additionality of counterpart funds
11  particularly in the social sectors.  This 
tended  to  obscure  the  broader policy  issues.  At  the  sector  level,  the  EC  has  contributed  more 
effectively to the development of policy in water supply, small-scale agriculture and bananas, areas in 
which it has had a long-standing involvement. 
The remainder of this chapter considers the scope and effectiveness of the policy dialogue in  three 




Between  1993  and  1997, EC  assistance accounted for  53% of all  grant aid  disbursements  and  20%  of total  aid 
disbursements to Jamaica. 
There  was  a long debate  with  the Government over whether counterpart funds  were  additional to or  part of the 
Government's general budgetary provision in the social sectors. 
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B.  Indicative Programming 
Key Features 
The indicative programming exercise for EDF 8 focused around two main stages: (i) the preparation 
of a Strategy Paper which was an internal EC exercise involving consultation between the EC and the 
Member States; and (ii) the preparation of the NIP which was a joint exercise involving the EC and 
the Government.  This involved a lengthy consultation process that was spread out over a period of 
two years (Box  1).  The main  innovations compared with previous EDFs was the  requirement for 
Delegations to prepare a Strategy Paper, which replaced a less analytical pre-programming exercise. 
Instructions  to  the  Delegation  for  the  programming  the  NIP  for  Jamaica  for  the  eighth  EDF 
emphasised: 
•  concentration in priority sectors; 
•  the incorporation of EU Treaty objectives related to aid; and 
•  the need for coordination and consultation with member states representatives in the field. 
Box 1:  Programming of the Eighth EDF 
Stage  Timing 
Preparation of the Strategy Paoer 
0  Start preparations for programming exercise  January 1995 
In the Delegation 
0  Rrst meeting with EU Member States  April 1995 
0  Production  of  Strategy  Paper  by  the  May 1995 
Delegation 
0  Review of strategy paper  July -september 
1995 
0 ·Revision  of ·strategy  paper  and  circulation  October 1995 
.  . ..  among  Member  States  representatives  tn  :  .. 
·  -~Jamaica 
'  ~  -~  ....  ~ 
· 0  Finalisatlon of Strategy Pa~r  :·-.  _  .  January 1996 
Preparation of the NIP  . _-- ;:·  .. ··:· ...  :-- ;  --~ 
'  '(•  "''.  .....  -:-~~J-::·~  "'1"'..,....,,,.:;'  ....  ~;:-q.~'  --~:..v......:.~-,;"  ....  ~  .. ""\!'' 
Responsibility 
EC Delegation 
EC Delegation and representatives of EU 
Member states 
EC Delegation 
Desk OffiCer DG VIII, Member States 
representatives and Comite de Suivi 
EC Delegation 
EC Delegation 
·  .. :  ~- --lnforinal  prep~ratori· meeting--between ·the  ~~  1996,  ·~.-,..  .. ·. · _ ~c  Delegation  and PJOJ 
-~:~~~~~~~  ~~L  -~C  -~::··:~~~-----,:  .·  ~~-••  -~ 
.. EDFB  .. ,,.  ·  .,·:·  .  ···  '  ·,,' .. 
0 · Discussion  of  Strategy  Paper  in  ·  EDF  June 1996 
__ C.Ommittee: agreement on draft_NIP  c 
0  Progiamming.  meeting  between  Delegation  October 1996 
...  and  PlOJ:. presentation  of  draft  NIP  and  ,, ,  .,  _  ,  ; 
· ·  dis~  of list  of projects  -- .  ·- . .  .  ... 
0 · Draft NIP sent to Headquarters  · ·  >.· 
0  Discussion of revised draft NIP· 
0  Signature of the NIP 
. ''  .~  November 1996 
December 1996 
February.1997 
DG VIII and representatives of EU member 
states in EDF Committee 
EC _Delegation and PIOJ 
EC Delegation 
ComitS de SuM 
PIOJ and representative of EC 
The  Strategy  Paper  for  Jamaica  provides  an  overview  of  the  social  and  economic  structure, 
constraints, potential and development perspectives and gives a description of current government 
policies and objectives, the input of foreign aid and the experience of  EC assistance to Jamaica.  In 
the  subsequent  sections  two  main  areas  for  EC  assistance  are  identified:  poverty  alleviation  and 
infrastructure. In general terms the NIP reflects closely what was suggested in the Strategy Paper. 
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Dialogue With the Government 
According to the PIOJ the NIP reflects well the priorities of the Government. The PIOJ was positive 
about the programming exercise, the success of which was attributed to the efforts of the Delegation 
staff to understand and support the Government's position.  The process was regarded as having been 
consultative and 'not too traumatic'. 
At a sector level there was considerable consensus between the PIOJ and the Delegation on the issues 
of poverty and social tension. However, there was some disagreement about the EC' s decision not to 
include rural development as  a focal  sector.  The EC  preferred to  get  away from agricultural type 
projects because of difficulties that had been experienced in the relationship with the sector, ministry 
and the implementing agency. In  addition, the EC  was sceptical about the potential for a large rural 
development project that was being proposed by the PIOJ had listed following proposals from various 
implementing agencies (Box 2). 
Box 2:  Proposed EC Assistance to Jamaica Under the Eighth EDF 
·Comparison of the NIPs for EDF 7 and EDF 8 shows the considerable continuity in the EC co-operation with 
Jamaica. The only major difference is the decision under EDF 8 to invest less in agricultural projects. 
EDF 8 pays less attention to infrastructure (25% from NIP compared to 48% in the previous NIP) and almost 
three times as much to the poverty alleviation sector which compares to rural development and agriculture 
under EOF 7.  However, this difference is largely offset by the large sum of money provided from the Sysmin 
faciflty for infrastructure (70 Mecu) and the fact that water & sanitation projects were included under 
infrastructure in EOF 7 and under poverty alleviation in EDF 8. Under EOF 7 several projects were 
implemented by RADA, the implementing agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, whereas for EDF 8 agricultural 
projects hardly feature. 'For EDF 8 allocations for micro-projects have been increased, partly as a result of 
relative success in projects under EOF 7 and partly as they are comparatively easy to manage as the 
Delegation has considerable discretion for the implementation of these projects.  . 
Th~'NIP  tor EDF 7 included severaf paragraphs on th~  intention of the GOJ to accelerate project 
implementation by improving procedures in accordance with the conclusions of a Project Implementation 
. Review Seminar. The EDF 8 NIP contains a special section on coherence with other instruments and a 
'Chapter on eritry into force, ·implementation and monitoring which covers the newly introduced concept of 
pha,sed p~ogramming. .  ·  ·  <  ...... :  •  ·  • 
National arid regional projects and programmes financed by the EC are coherent in that activities in non-focal 
sectors (human resource development and trade development) relate to areas of concentration for the 
regional programmes. 
At Headquarters, the  Comite de Suivi  was  responsible for verifying the coherence of the Strategy 
Paper and  the  draft  NIP  and  for  ensuring  that  all  instructions  and  appropriate  regulations  were 
reflected. Most of their conunents on  the Strategy Paper referred to a further elaboration of certain 
areas.  After the  presentation of the draft NIP,  the  Comite only  sought clarification concerning the 
differences between the Strategy Paper and the NIP.  The Delegation perceived its dialogue with the 
Government to be very constructive. 
Consultation Wzth Member States 
In the preparation of the Strategy Paper, Member States were fonnally consulted three times for their 
views, whereas in-country discussion during the preparation of the NIP was somewhat more limited. 
The latter primarily involved the Delegation and the PIOJ.  The Member States also played an active 
role in the EDF Committee.  Although representatives of the Member States indicated that they were 
well informed, some concerns were noted about the programming process and the realism of some 
implementation  assumptions.  When  the  Strategy  Paper  and  NIP  were  discussed  in  the  EDF 
Committee, some Member States focused on the need to give greater emphasis to the environment, 
gender, and the role of NGOs and the private sector. 
IDC - August 1998  17 Chapter ill  Policy Dialogue 
C.  Structural Adjustment 
Role of  the EC in the General Economic Policy Dialogue 
The period under evaluation saw a rapid shift from economic 'success' under the IMF programme to 
a collapse of the banking sector and large liabilities being imposed on government finances.  The EC 
has supported the stabilisation package negotiated between the BWI and the Government.  Within 
this package the first tier of policy dialogue relating to macroeconomic reforms has been led by the 
IMF with no direct participation of the EC.  In the second tier of structural adjustment reforms, led by  -
the World Bank, the EC has participated through the provision of balance of payments support. Its 
particular concern has been to maintain a policy dialogue, consistent with the objectives of the Lome 
Convention, aimed at addressing the social consequences of adjustment and the need to "protect" key  . 
social expenditures.  As  part of this dialogue, the  Delegation maintained good relations and close 
contact with the local representations of the BWI. 
The original EC fmancing allocation to support structural adjustment was made in June 1990, since 
when total assistance of 8.4 Mecu has been provided.  The size of the allocation was thus relatively 
small  and  by  itself  insufficient  to  provide  significant  leverage  in  policy  discussion  (Box  3). 
Nevertheless, the relative importance of EC aid as a whole means that the EC has a direct concern in 
structural adjustment policies in the major sectors in which it is involved.  Furthermore, the wider EC 
assistance is  affected by issues about the fungibility of resources and the extent to which domestic 
financing may be switched to other sectors as a consequence of EC support to a sector programme, or 
more generally that the provision of aid may result in reduced revenue raising efforts.
12 
Box 3:  Scope of EC Involvement In Structural Adjustment 
The following communication from Headquarters in March 1991 indicates the relatively limited objectives of 
the EC's involvement in the general economic policy dialogue: 
'The rules governing the distribution of  the EDF, and the method chosen to allocate the first 
tranche of  structural adjustment resources, do not allow a weight of  EC aid  that is significant in 
terms of  {Jamaica's] overall financing requirements. Also, at  present  the difficulties that have 
affected the disbursement of  previous EDFs have also prevented a real  policy dialogue in terms of 
sectoral reforms. This will make it difficult for the EC to exert much pressure on the Government, 
or  on the BWI, as to the pace or  content of  the reform programme. Unless and  until  a sectoral 
policy refonn dialogue develops, the most appropriate way to support the programme must  be 
through an addition of  foreign exchange to the general foreign exchange market...  · 
In  general,  the EC has  had a  limited dialogue on economic policy refonns with the Government 
except in those areas where it has a strong sectoral or project involvement.  On macroeconomic issues 
it has sought maintain an "infonnation dialogue" through informal discussions with the Government 
and other donors.  The need for the EC to be more actively engaged with the broader policy dialogue 
has been stressed in the recent Green Paper (p. 9) where the past failures in project aid are ascribed, 
inter alia, to a tendency in project aid 'to underestimate of the macroeconomic framework in ensuring 
a satisfactory impact'.  In Jamaica, the macroeconomic framework has a major impact on sector and 
project issues, as well as on the population and poverty concerns targeted by EC projects. 
12  For an example near Jamaica, see Pack H and J R Pack, Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility, The Review 
of Economics and Statistics,  1993, pp  258-265. The authors  show the  presence of categorical fungibility in the 
Dominican Republic 'consistent with the most negative views on this question in the literature'. 
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Policy Dialogue on the Structural Adjustment Support Programme 
The dialogue around the Structural Adjustment Support Programme (SASP) in Jamaica provides an 
example of the difficulties in  this  type of policy dialogue (Box 4).  The operation of the SASP in 
Jamaica was similar to that in other countries.  However, the difference is that the fiscal management 
in Jamaica (in contrast to  monetary  management) has  been relatively conservative.  This was  also 
reflected in the use of the counterpart funds for budgetary support where the Financial Secretary took 
a fiscally conservative approach  which  resulted in  some difficulties and  misunderstandings  in  the 
policy dialogue with the EC. 
Box 4:  SASP and the Counterpart Funds Issue 
In the allocation of counterpart funds a major concern of the EC was their additionality and whether budgeted 
allocations would be executed.  However, there appears to have been limited analytical support behind this 
concerns.  The position of the EC, expressed in a July 1997 report on counterpart funds, was that 'the 
Ministry of  Finance cannot simply promise the execution of  such elementary steps as actually spending the 
funds' since 'evety  year the Ministty of  Finance systematically reduces the budget (in the social sectors) 
without notice~ However, reference to the Public Expenditure Review and to the Financial Statements for 
1996/97 and 1997/98 does not appear to support that view.  Social sector spending appear to reflect the 
budget fairly accurately. 
tnitially, the Government sought to satisfy the concerns of the EC by providing the relevant budget and 
expenditure information.  However the Delegation sought a stronger earmarking of the funds within the 
budget, noting in April 1995 that 'he fundamental principle of  earmarking the counterpart funds to the social 
sectors is not well understood and line ministries have difficulties In absorbing important amounts of  new 
resources~ This led to the EC seeking the allocation of counterpart funds to programmes supported by 
organisations, such as PAHOIWHO and UNICEF, which could 'obtain mention of  their activities in the 
national budget and ensure reporting and disbursement as and when foreseen~ 
The disagreement between the Government and the EC over how to budget counterpart funds was long.  In 
the end a compromise appears to have been reached, with the MOF to some degree withdrawing from the 
dialogue as the PIOJ (NAO) took over the discussions, and the counterpart funds were projectised, including 
a donation to UNICEF. The 'earmarking' to the Social Investment Fund was non-additional and what was 
wanted by the MOF, whereas additional projects were placed into the capital budgets, as required by the EC. 
Considerable  delays  were  experienced  in  the  implementation  of the  SASP.  While  the  original 
fmancing allocations for a GIP was made in June 1990, the Financing Agreement was not signed until 
1994,  while  the  fmal  release  of  counterpart  funds  did  not  occur  until  March  1998
13
•  One 
consequence of this delay was that choice of a GIP facility as the means for disbursing the EC funds 
was  no  longer appropriate  by  the  time  the  EC  fmancing  arrived  since  by  then  foreign  exchange 
liberalisation had taken place. 
During implementation of the SASP, the policy dialogue seems to have been limited  and was mostly 
focused on issues relating to the use of counterpart funds 
•  General Economic Reform Issues.  The SASP was  linked to the reform process, but the 
EC  recognised that its approach and analysis in  this area was to be low key.  Although 
uappropriate" macroeconomic policies were a condition of the SASP assistance, these do 
not  appear to  have  been the subject of discussion  with the  Government, reflecting the 
EC' s  and  Member  States  policy  of  supporting  the  IMF  in  macroeconomic  reform 
negotiations. 
13  The Memorandum of Understanding on  the  use  of counterpart  funds  Financing was  signed  in  June  1991,  the 
financing proposal was completed in April 1992.  There was a second Memorandum of Understanding in February 
1995 and a rider (January 1996). 
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•  Fiscal Management.  Policy dialogue on issues of fiscal management appears to focused 
rather narrowly on  the  use of counterpart funds,  rather than  on  the  broader issues  of 
financing of the social sectors as has occurred in SASPs elsewhere
14
•  The main concern 
of the  EC  appears  to  be  been  the  additionality  of its  counterpart  funds.  The  1991 
Memorandum  of Understanding  noted  that  the  EC's  earmarked  funds  would  finance 
expenditures that are not financed by other donors.  However, the position of the MOF 
was  that counterpart funds  were  to  be  considered  to  be  in  the  budget,  and  therefore 
automatically  included  in  the  Government's  revenue  and  expenditure  calculations. 
Treating counterpart funds  as  incremental  financing  would  have  increased  the  budget 
deficit and been inflationary.  The resulting discussion was protracted and a major cause 
of the considerable delay in releasing the counterpart funds (Box 4). 
In  the  1995  rider to  the  Financing Agreement,  it  was  stipulated that the EC was  to  be 
involved  in  the  Public  Expenditure  Review.  However,  this  did  not  take  place  and  the 
opportunity for the EC to contribute to the debate on broader public expenditure strategies 
was missed. 
•  Protection of Social Sector Programmes.  A major objective of the SASP programme was 
to protect social sector spending at a time of fiscal stress.  The EC counterpart funds were 
seen as the vehicle through which this concern was to be addressed.  However, the SASP 
also  reflected  a  wider concern  to  support the  institutions  managing social expenditure 
programmes in order that resources could be used more effectively.  The lengthy debate 
over the use of the EC counterpart funds and their eventual allocation as project financing 
tended to obscure the budgeting and resource management issues in the sector.  A further 
risk arose from "projectising" the use of counterpart funds is that this could encourage the 
establishment of parallel resource management systems undermining the role of the line 
numstries.  To  some  extent  this  occurred  in  Jamaica  (although  the  EC  was  not  the 
instigator).  There is  now  more  awareness of this  problem with  the  Social Investment 
Fund properly linked to sectoral ministry programmes.  The EC has not directly assisted 
ministries  in  the  planning and  management of budgetary  and  service delivery reforms 




Since  1978,  the  BWI have  provided  more  than  US$ 1 billion  to  Jamaica in  adjustment  lending. 
However the country has still not achieved stabilisation and questions over the approach adopted by 
the BWI in Jamaica (Box 5) raise  the issue of the extent to which the EC should have sought a 
stronger involvement in the general economic policy dialogue and offered an alternative source of 
policy  advice.
16  However,  this  would  have  required  greater  professional  resources  than  were 
available within the Delegation. 
14  EC involvement in the Public Expenditure Review process is  generally required as an EU condition in order to 
ensure that resource allocations to the social sectors are adequate and partly to influence wider fiscal choices. 
IS  For example the Public Expenditure Review noted that the Ministry of Education was institutionally weak and the 
sector under-financed. 
16  This issue is a complex one which it would be difficult to address fully in this report. 
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Box 5:  Stabilisation and Adjustment 
.  .::"'',  .-..  ..... 
Despite the adoption of successive packages economic reform measures, Jamaica has continued to be 
~ectad  by macroeconomic policy failure: 
:·,- '·'·;~0  A  1989 Wortd Bank report was highly critical of three structural adjustment operations implemented 
during 1981 ~86: 
'  •.. in several important ways the Jamaican economy-now burdened with a massive 
foreign debt- was in worst shape than it had been five years earlier, at the start of 
the first SAL ..• The massive capital inflows of  the early years, in the form of  balance 
of  payments support, would have delayed the adjustment, even if  the Government 
had wanted to adjust faster.  They led to the real appreciation of  the exchange rate 
and to the maintenance of  large and unsustainable fiscal and external current 
-,-,  .  account deficits'.
11 
.  .  ,.  - .  - . 
.  ~-;- ~--_:  <:.o·~···A ~o~~  .recent report concluded that that struct~ral adjustment lending did n~t  have a major positive 
,  ·  .. ·.  impact because the external financing encouraged a delay in economic adjustmenr
18
• 
,,  0  Fundamental economic and institutional issues were not addressed in BWI conditionalities.  Thus, 
although the performance targets of the IMF were met in 1996 when the twelfth program ended, the 
. BWl programme's overlooked: 
•  linkages between the financial sector and the real sector of the economy 
•  the policy of bailing out banks and insurance companies; internal indebtedness which 
would not have been so severe if the Government had maintained its former 
foreign/domestic debt structure; 
•  institutional reform to ensure independence of the BOJ; 
•  trade reform and the need for a programme for industriaf competitiveness and 
productivity. 
TheSe problems reflect in many ways reflect the more fundamental inadequacies in coordination between 
stabiUsation and adjustment measures which have characterised structural adjustment problems and which 
have been documented elsewhere 
19
• 
In conclusion, an important economic reform dialogue became characterised by lengthy delays in the 
release  of funds  and  a  long  discussion  on  the  use  of counterpart  funds.  The  SASP  was  a  new 
instrument  and  difficult  to  implement.  This  contributed  to  the  debate  over  whether  the  EC' s 
counterpart funds  should have been additional.  Staffmg constraints within the Delegation may also 
have contributed to the  lack of a wider discussion on the broader fiscal  planning and management 
issues.  While the argument that project interventions were the best that could be achieved under the 
circumstances must be taken seriously, it may be the case that an opportunity to build up dialogue, 
linked to sectoral interests, has been missed since 1991 and throughout the critical period of the BWI 
programme. 
D.  Sectoral Policy Dialogue 
The general view in the Delegation and in the Member States is that there is more scope for sectoral 
than macro dialogue.  Infrastructure development has  been a key objective at the sector level with 
roads and water being the main focal sectors.  Support to  these sectors has to a considerable extent 
been linked to the development of tourist industry.  The roads programme has focused on improving 
infrastructure in  the northern tourism areas.  In the water sector, sewerage development have been 
supported  in  two  areas  heavily  dependent on  tourist development,  and  there  has  also  been  some 
investment in  rural water supply development. The other area of sector policy focus has been ·rural 
development which, under EDF 8, has become more explicitly poverty alleviation. 
17  World Bank, Jamaica: Structural Adjustment Loans I and ll, Washington DC, 1989, pp xxx-xxxi. 
18  Jamaica:  Achieving  Macro-Stability  and  removing  Constraints  on  Growth,  Country  Economic  Memorandum, 
May 1996, p 1. 
19  More recently in the "External Evaluation of the ESAF', IMP, 1998. P. Collier, J. Gunning, et. al. 
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Some donors questioned the EC'  s emphasis on infrastructure aid and the linkage with development of 
the tourism industry.  However, tourism plays a crucial role in the Jamaican economy and is a sector 
that is  very dependent on an adequate infrastructure including roads and water and sanitation where 
the required investments are large.  In a middle income country like Jamaica there is a good case for 
focusing  project  aid  on  such  capital  investment  so  that  domestic  fmancing  can  be  more  directly 
targeted towards social sector programmes where the requirement is primarily for sustained recurrent 
financing.  However,  the  quid  pro quo  of such a strategy is  that the  poverty concerns of aid  are 
addressed through an active fiscal dialogue that ensures adequate spending in the social sectors.  The 
strategy set out in the Strategy Paper and NIP is consistent with this analysis. 
The remainder of this section considers the policy dialogue in  relation to EC support programmes in 
water and sanitation, and in bananas. 
Water and Sanitation 
The EC assistance  in  the  water sector provides  a good example of the  difficulties  that  have  been 
encountered in policy dialogue at the sector level.  Only recently, following the publication of a paper 
on  Social  Water in  1994,  has  the  Government  started  to  address  the  issue  of lack of policy and 
strategy  for  water  and  sanitation.  One  result  of the  absence  of a  water  strategy  has  been  the 
orientation of a policy in the sector towards exclusively engineering concerns to the neglect of issues 
water supply management, financial sustainability and social policy. There has also been a troubled 
history in the cooperation with the National Water Commission (NWC), which led to the World Bank 
and other donors withdrawing from support to the NWC in 1997. 
The EC has been involved urban and rural water sanitation projects.  Although the NWC prepared a 
paper on policy paper on  water in  1994, there are still outstanding issues of access to water supply 
among the poor.  Such issues should have been considered in the preparation of Rural Water Supply 
Project (Box 6). 
:.  ..  Box 6:  The Rural Water Supply Project 
.- .......  ,~.)"~-'~''  ~'  '''~:..·-
The Rural Water Supply Project (EDF 6). the implementation of which has been subject to significant delay, is 
currently being evaluated prior to its extension under EDF 8.  The project primarily benefits sman farmers 
living in geographical areas classified as among the poorest in Jamaica  · 
A conclusion from the evaluation is that the pn:)paf.ation of the project  was exclusively concerned with 
engineering issues. and that no attention was pald to the requirements of  the population and how they would 
react to improved water supplies. In the event. the population has utilised water for irrigation as  well as 
domestic supply.  Thfs, together with the increase in population in the area has resulted in water demand far 
exceeding the tevefs anticipated in the project design. a problem exacerbated by the substantial delays in 
project implementation.  The project also suffered from the tack of an agreed policy on providing metered 
standpipes in poorer communities which considerably reduced its poverty alleviation impact. 
One consequence of the delays in project implementation has been to highlight problems of administrative 
procedures within both the Government and the EC.  This has fed to the participation of the EC in the Public 
Sector Modernisation Programme to support the refonn of the government procurement system. 
The Delegation has benefited from having a resident technical adviser on water and sanitation since 
1991  who has played a key role in identifying policy issues to be raised with the NWC and GOJ in 
areas  such  a  maintenance,  tariffication  and  provisions  of connections.  The Delegation  has  also 
coordinated a work group with other donors involved in the sector, principally the World Bank, USA, 
Canada, and the UN organisations.  These initiatives appear to have had some influence in assisting 
the Government to better define its policy in the sector.  This is reflected in the change in emphasis in 
the  NIP  for  EDF 8  away  from  direct  infrastructure  investment  and  towards  (i) management  and 
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maintenance of water facilities  and  waste  disposal;  and  (ii) poverty  alleviation  through  the  better 
targeting of potential beneficiaries in the design of projects. 
The EC has also provided T  A to the NWC under an Institutional Strengthening Project
20
.  This aimed 
to  reform  the  NWC  into  a  "customer  driven"  and  "business  orientated"  organisation  through: 
(i) rebuilding  the  planning,  planning  and  programming  capacities  of  NWC;  (ii) optimising 
commercial  and  technical  operations;  and  (iii) improving  performance  and  productivity  of NWC 
staff.  Initial progress in  implementing the programme was hindered due to the removal of the NWC 
board and its senior management before the programme started.  Thereafter, the project faced a less 
favourable environment within NWC which restricted the introduction of the planned reforms.  As a 
result the project achieved less tangible results than had been expected although some progress was 
made  in  introducing  new  procedures  in  the  areas  of management  information,  water  resources 
management, operations and maintenance, financing and budget preparation, and project preparation. 
In general, therefore, although the policy dialogue in the water sector has been relatively low-key and 
protracted, it has resulted in a gradual pressure with Government to resolve the outstanding problems 
and issues in the sector. 
Bananas 
Banana farming in  Jamaica is  not as  central to  the export economy as  it is  to  the Windward Island 
banana  economies,  but  it  is  nevertheless  an  important  source  of income  for  a  segment  of the 
population.  Currently, there are three large estates and about 500 small growers.  In 1993, there were 
1,500 growers. 
The Banana Support Programme (BSP), which is financed out of a Budget Line is a good example of 
small-scale intervention which has had a positive policy impact.  The programme has benefited trade 
and the private sector, and has successfully targeted small fanners.  It has  assisted with the virtual 
elimination  of Black Sigatoka disease  which  would  otherwise  have  probably  wiped  out  much  of 
Jamaica's banana production.  It has also supported a successful credit scheme, although its impact 
has been reduced by the high real interest rates which have been a consequence of the Government's 
macroeconomic  policies.  There are  strong links  between the activities  of the  BSP and  the EC's 
support for the water sector, since irrigation has an crucial role in upgrading of banana quality, but is 
affected by the extensive restrictions and bureaucracy, and environmental concerns. 
The  policy  dialogue  on  bananas  has  been  conducted  between  the  EC  and  the  Banana  Export 
Company (BECO), which is a private company owned by the banana exporters.  This is probably one 
reason for its relative success since the involvement is directly with fanners.  In the key policy areas 
relating  to  the  negotiations  with  the  WTO  and  the  transitional  problems  faced  uy  the  sector, 
successful policy dialogue appears to have been more difficult. 
One aspect of this type of programme, which is  common with other agriculture programmes which 
are  very dependent on the  timeliness of inputs, is  the inability of EC  administrative systems to  be 
responsive. Thus, the success of the BSP has depended on the ability of TA, recipient institutions and 
the Delegation itself to overcome administrative hurdles set up by EC's systems and procedures. 
20  TheTA was provided though a twinning arrangement with Thames Water International. 
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CHAPTER IV.  AID IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT 
A.  Introduction 
Effective policy dialogue  and efficient programme  implementation require  strong aid  management 
procedures.  This chapter considers how the EC  manages the  implementation its aid programme in 
Jamaica.  Specifically  it  addresses:  (i) the  role  and  functioning  of the  NAO's  office;  (ii) project 
identification, planning and appraisal; (iii) the implementation of aid programmes and projects. 
B.  Role and Functioning of the NAO's Office 
A strength of the  institutional  arrangements  for  the  management of EC  aid  in  Jamaica is  that  the 
NAO' s Office is fully integrated into the PIOJ which itself is a department of the MOP.  The PI  OJ'  s 
mandate is to take investment projects to the implementation stage. 
However, the management of the EC programme extends the role of the PIOJ into overseeing project 
implementation and financial management which is  beyond the scope of its normal functions.  This 
has resulted in a heavy administrative workload which  has  necessitated the employment, under EC 
financing, of two additional members of staff in  order to improve the timeliness of NAO actions.  It 
has  also led to  the  perception that the  role of the PIOJ  has  become too  pervasive and centralised. 
Several  government departments  visited  by  the  team felt  the  system to  be too complex  in  that it 
embraced both  technical  issues  as  well  as  programme  management  and  administration  functions. 
Thus, a department in the MOF was critical of the decision to  channel technical discussions on the 
SASP through  PIOJ  and  considered  that  this  had  significantly  reduced  the  quality  of the  policy 
dialogue. One Member State representative also voiced similar criticisms of the NAO system. 
C.  Programme and Project Identification Planning and Appraisal 
In  the programming of the NIP, the PIOJ relies on parastatal implementing agencies and Ministries 
for  the  identification  of projects  and  programmes.  The  PIOJ  then  undertakes  a  pre-selection  of 
projects  before  they  are  presented  to  the  Committee  for  Public  Investment  Programmes,  and 
subsequently plays an important role in  the appraisal of proposals before they are submitted to the 
Delegation.  One  criticism of this  procedure  is  that  in  some  cases  it  results  in the  programming 
process being too influenced by the history of previous EC aid interventions.  Also, in the past there 
was insufficient interaction in programming activities between the PIOJ and private sector and civil 
society organisations.  In the 8th EDF NIP, however, dialogue with the private sector was an important 
factor in the expansion of the trade development programme. 
The EC Delegation and PIOJ rely heavily on consultants in the design of projects and programmes. 
This involves some risks,  particularly where consultants do not have  sufficient insight on political 
and implementation constraints affecting the acceptability of the programme or the management of it. 
Thus, the evaluation of the Target Europe Programme identified a range of factors where the impact 
of the  programme  had  been  negatively  affected  by  inappropriate  assumptions  the  programme 
design21 •  In  the water and  sanitation sector, design errors have resulted in  serious implementation 
21  TDI, Target Europe Programme, Mid-term review, Final Report, January 1997, p. 5. 
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delays and in some cases faults in completed systems.  In  the case of one sewerage project, which is 
now  being evaluated,  the  long-run  sustainability  of the  investment  was  not  taken  adequately into 
account in project design.  According to the former project manager, neither the Government nor the 
EC had available the professional resources needed to review the design proposals adequately.  As a 
result, in the contract documents there were some design omissions and ambiguities affecting costs. 
D.  Programme and Project Implementation 
Around 30o/o of NIP allocations for EDF 7 had been disbursed at the end of 1997.  This disbursement 
rate compares relatively favourably with that for some other ACP countries. 
Chain of  Decision Making 
Implementation  of  projects  is  often  delayed  because  of  the  lengthy  approval  process  within 
Government.  The number of levels (which may include the NAO, ministries, implementing agencies 
and Cabinet) involved in  approving projects, tender evaluations and payment processing, lengthens 
the  time  needed to  reach  decisions.  Delays  on  the  EC  side compound the  problem.  The Post-Fiji 
study undertaken by Price Waterhouse noted this issue in  1992.  The World Bank also raised it with 
reference to  Government disbursement practices  when  it  reviewed strategies for  disbursements  of 
Bank-financed projects in  1995. 
The Government has maintained a fairly centralised way of dealing with payments on donor funded 
projects.  Ministries and implementing agencies do  not  have direct access to  donor funds,  through 
mechanisms  such  as  special  accounts.  Instead  all  payments  have  been  made  directly  from  the 
Consolidated Fund to which reimbursement is then made by the donor organisation.
22 
Coordination Between Different Aid Instruments 
In  Jamaica,  the  EC  has  generally  targeted  the  assistance  available under different aid  instruments 
towards  a  limited  number of sectors  and  objectives  resulting  in  a  relatively  well  coordinated aid 
programme.  However, some problems of coordination do  exist, particularly between national and 
regional programmes.  For example in trade development, Jamaica has a Target Europe programme 
aimed at stimulating product and trade development. In addition there is a CEDA office in Jamaica as 
well as  a CDI antenna. Despite the fact that all are included in  JAMPRO, the Jamaican investment 
promotion  agency,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  much  coordination  among  these  initiatives.  The 
evaluators of the Target Europe Programme state that they  'saw no evidence of any coordination of 
approach between the programme and its regional component, indeed the regional technical adviser 
was not even aware of the latter'. 
23 
Tendering and Procurement 
In Jamaica, the tendering process is  directed by  the Central Tender Board.  For major contracts the 
procedures  are  lengthy  and  involve  consideration  by  several  committees  and  frequently  Cabinet 
approval.  The  threshold  for  tender  approval  on  smaller  contracts  involving  the  Government 
Contracts Committee has  been eroded by  inflation with the result that an  increasing proportion of 
contracts are having to be referred for decision at a higher level. 
The  additional  requirements  of the  EC' s tendering procedures  result in  further delays and do  not 
always give sufficient regard to the advice and judgement of the Government and the Delegation.  An 
example  is  the  tendering for  the  Road  Rehabilitation  Project  (RRISP).  The  Government  and  the 
22 
23 
This procedure is now subject to  change, and a number of project management units can have access to  special 
project accounts. 
TDI, p.  23 
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Delegation argued that this project should be undertaken under a 'direct labour' contract which would 
allow  the  Government  to  split  up  the  project  into  various  smaller components  and  recruit  local 
contractors for each of them. This was, however, unacceptable to Headquarters, which argued for an 
open international tender. The Delegation replied that there would be no  interest from international 
companies  because  of the  nature  of the  work.  It  therefore  suggested  a  restricted  tender under an 
accelerated procedure open only  to  local companies  and  to  split up  the  contract which  because it 
would have otherwise been too big for most local companies. The Delegation was overruled and an 
open international tender in one lot took place.  As predicted, no international company tendered and 
only 4 local consortia of companies responded to  the tender. The overruling of an informed decision 
from the field led to considerable criticism within the Government and resulted in a delay of 4 years. 
Financial Accountability. 
The financial accountability insisted on in  the EC system, both by Headquarters and Member States, 
is  extremely  detailed  and  the  procedures  involved  absorb  an  enormous  amount  of attention  from 
Delegations in the field.  The Bureau of Heads of Delegations recently commented on this issue that 
'the lack of deconcentration is  an aberration compared with the degree of responsibility of Heads of 
Delegations in aid management'. 
24 
· 
In practice, the responsibilities of Delegations combined with EC procedures for the implementation 
of its  aid  result  in  a  heavy  administrative  task  for  professional  staff  in  Delegations.  Previous 
evaluations looking at aid to Jamaica have also commented on the extreme workloads and the purely 
administrative nature of the work of Delegation advisers.
25  Within Headquarters decision making is 
also highly centralised and most decisions are made at a high level in  the EC.  According to the EC 
70% of the decisions are taken at the Commissioner, Director General and Deputy Director General 
while Heads of Delegation take the rest. 
26 
Administrative Burden. 
Due  to  the  administration  burden  on  advisers,  policy matters  are  often left aside because of time 
constraints, and there is a question of whether staffmg in the Delegation are optimally deployed. The 
EC Delegation has also been impeded by long vacancies of advisers' posts combined with a complex 
set of issues (aid, trade,  structural reform) to  be dealt with  by a small number of officials.  Policy 
dialogue,  representative  functions  and  day-to-day  management  of EC  aid  to  Jamaica  create  a 




Report of meetings of bureau of heads of Delegation with Brussels services, 9 September 1997. 
International  Multi~disciplinary Consultancy,  Evaluation  of preparation  and  implementation  of projects  and 
Programmes financed under Lome I,  II, Ill  in Jamaica,  1991, pp v, C-6 
Acting Director General,  1997, Instructions to DG  VIII staff at headquaners and in  the Delegations in the ACP 
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Relations with Headquarters. 
Both the Delegation and the  NAO Office reported some difficulties  in  dealing with Headquarters 
staff due  to  the  high  turnover of Desk Officers for  Jamaica with  four in  the last five  years.  The 
usefulness of support from the Desk Officer depends on the individual, but is heavily influenced by 
the time spent as a desk officer and by previous experience of working in a Delegation. In some areas, 
such as  transport infrastructure and poverty, the Delegation gets  additional support from experts in 
the policy divisions of DG Vill. 
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List of People Interviewed 
Delegation 
Mr J Moran - Head of Delegation 
Mr F Carrerras - Economic Adviser 
Mr T L Jackson- EIT, Technical Attache 
Mr R J Schierhorst - ALA  T, Rural Development Adviser 
Member States 
H.E. Fernando de la Serna, Ambassador for Spain 
MrS Maspoch- First Secretary, Spanish Embassy 
Mr van der Lugt- First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy 
Dr von Menchow-Pohl, First Secretary, German Embassy 
Mr J D Martin - French Trade Commissioner 
Mr J Malcolm- Deputy British High Commissioner 
Ms W Freeman-Second Secretary, British High Commission 
World Bank 
Ms S Adams- Acting Resident Representative 
Mr E Graham - Economist 
PAHO 
Dr R Van West Charles 
Government of  Jamaica 
Mr R G Brooks - Deputy Secretary Finance 
Mrs I Ormsby - MOF 
Ms L Palmer - Director, PIOJ 
Ms L Francis - PIOJ 
Ms H Gillings - PIOJ 
Ms G Davies - PIOJ 
National Water Commission 
Mr R Cranston - President 
Mr P Collins - Technical Assistant funded by the EC 
Banana Export Company 
Mr S Coppieters - Technical Assistant funded by the EC 
Other Public Sector Agencies 
Ms S Gillings - Managing Director Jamaica Social Investment Fund 
Mr Salmon- Poverty Eradication programme 
IDC - August 1998  29 
Annex The  author accepts sole  responsibility for this  report,  drawn up  on  behalf of the  Working Group  of  Heads of Evaluation Services (Development) of 
European Union and the Commission. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Working Group or the Commission, which funded this rep• 